Female employment and fertility: the effects of rising female wages by Siegel, Christian
  
ISSN 2042-2695 
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1156 
July 2012 
Female Employment and Fertility - The Effects of 
Rising Female Wages 
Christian Siegel 
 
 
 
 
    
Abstract 
Increases in female employment and falling fertility rates have often been linked to rising 
female wages. However, over the last 30 years the US total fertility rate has been fairly stable 
while female wages have continued to grow. Over the same period, we observe that women's 
hours spent on housework have declined, but men's have increased. I propose a model with a 
shrinking gender wage gap that can capture these trends. While rising relative wages tend to 
increase women's labor supply and, due to higher opportunity cost, lower fertility, they also 
lead to a partial reallocation of home production from women to men, and a higher use of 
labor-saving inputs into home production. I find that both these trends are important in 
understanding why fertility did not decline to even lower levels. As the gender wage gap 
declines, a father's time at home becomes more important for raising children. When the 
disutilities from working in the market and at home are imperfect substitutes, fertility can 
stabilize, after an initial decline, in times of increasing female market labor. That parents can 
acquire more market inputs into child care is what I find important in matching the timing of 
fertility. In a mode l extension, I show that the results are robust to intrahousehold bargaining. 
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1 Introduction
Between the 1960s and today, we have seen enormous changes to the economic and de-
mographic structure in all Western countries. There has been a decline in total fertility
rates1 and an increase in women’s market hours (see figures 1 and 2 for US data).
Many authors explain both with a rise in female wages. An apparent puzzle, however,
is that while female wages and market hours have continued to grow, since the 1970s fer-
tility2 has stopped falling.3 Understanding the underlying fertility decisions is important
since they affect population growth, labor force composition and social security systems,
and thereby economic outcomes. In this paper I argue that the common driving force
behind the trends in fertility and in female employment is the narrowing of the gender
wage gap (shown in figure 3), rather than the level of female wages per se, since it changes
the division of labor within the family. Because of increasing disutilities from working at
home and in the market this reallocation has a nonlinear effect.
My explanation is based on the observation that men’s home hours have increased,
allowing women’s home hours to fall. In the 1960s, when the wage gap was big, the
catching up of females wages increases women’s labor supply. The associated increase in
the opportunity cost of women’s time, who shoulder most of child care, lowers fertility, as
argued by Becker (1960) or Galor and Weil (1996). But as relative wages become more
equal over time, specialization in the household decreases. Consequently, male home hours
increase, a father’s time at home becomes more important for raising children, and the
allocation of time between home and market work becomes more evenly balanced for men
and women. If there is imperfect substitutability in the disutilities from working at home
and in the market, the marginal utility cost of having an additional child can become
constant, despite women working more hours in the market.
Circumstantial evidence in favor of this mechanism is provided by data on non-market
hours. Using data from Aguiar and Hurst (2007), based on the American Time Use Survey
since 1965, I show the trends in hours spent on home production, including time spent
on child care and on obtaining goods, in figure 4.4 The data displays a shift in household
1The total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children that would be born if all women lived
to the end of their childbearing years and bore children according to the current age-specific birth rates.
2The total fertility rate and children ever born (CEB), a measure of completed fertility, display similar
trends. Based on US data for married women born 1826–1960, Jones and Tertilt (2008) report that CEB
and TFR, shifted by 27 years, are moving strongly together. Consistently, CPS data display since 1999
virtually constant CEB to women of age 40–44. Jones and Tertilt (2008) also document a strong decline
in fertility over the long-run; CEB to married women fell from about 5.5 children for the cohort born in
1928 to roughly 2 for the cohort of 1958.
3Most of the recent rise in the official total fertility rate is driven by the effects of immigration. For
US-born women the incline is much less and fertility virtually flat since the late 1970s, as I show in
appendix A.1.
4The measure is constructed as weekly hours spent on home production in a narrow sense, on obtaining
goods, and on basic child care. Arguably, for many people child care is an activity that is more enjoyable
than other forms of housework. Excluding child care from the measure of market work does not change
the qualitative trends. This can be seen in the regression results of table 10 in appendix A.2.
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Figure 1: Male and Female Market Hours Worked
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production from women to men, with an overall reduction of hours worked at home. My
findings are consistent with the earlier work of Robinson and Godbey (2008), who find,
based on time use data for 1965 to 1995, that there is convergence in activities across
gender.5
The importance of considering intrahousehold allocations can be seen in the right
panels of figure 4. While home hours of married men have increased over time, single
men’s hours of home production are constant, after an initial change between 1965 and
1975. This is consistent with the explanation I propose. Single men, without a female
partner, are not affected by rising female wages, but married men spent more hours
working at home –a trend in US data that has not received much attention by researchers
yet, with the notable exception of Knowles (2007).6 Single women, on the other hand,
spend less time working at home, but the decline is not as pronounced as for married
women, whose husbands devote more of their time to home production.7
To the best of my knowledge, the only previous paper that has noted the flattening
out in total fertility rates and informally suggested an explanation in terms of increased
male home production is Feyrer et al. (2008). My paper formally models and quantifies
the endogenous response of male and female hours and their implications for fertility.8 I
5They also report that average parental hours spent on child-care per child has been roughly constant.
Ramey and Ramey (2010), on the other hand, include time spent teaching children and document a rise
since the mid 1990s, especially for college educated parents.
6Burda et al. (2007) study time use data across various developed countries, and find that total work,
the sum of home and market work, is virtually the same for men and women. For the US, Ramey and
Francis (2009) report that total work of men and women has been constant throughout the 20th.
7In the Aguiar and Hurst (2007) data marital status is defined in a legal sense, and it is not possible
to disentangle cohabiting from other singles. In figure 19 of the appendix I show that home hours have
changed more for singles with children, who are more likely to be cohabiting, than for singles without
children.
8Feyrer et al. (2008) explain the increase in male home hours with intrahousehold bargaining. I show
that bargaining is not necessary; a change in relative wages per se implies not only a reallocation of work
in the market, but also at home. However, I also explore a version with intrahousehold bargaining.
4
10
20
30
40
50
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
Male Female
All Men and Women
10
20
30
40
50
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
Male Female
Married
10
20
30
40
50
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
Male Female
Single
Data from Aguiar and Hurst (2007) - ATUS
Weekly Hours Spend on Non-Market Work and Basic Child Care
Non-Market Hours of All Men and Women Aged 20-80
Figure 4: Male and Female Home Hours Worked
present a general equilibrium model matching the observed patterns of fertility and hours
worked through an exogenous decrease in the gender wage gap. In the benchmark model
I consider households maximizing the sum of male and female members utilities. A rise
in female relative wages directly increases female labor supply and lowers female home
production, whereas male time is getting devoted more to home activities and less to
market work. Initially, when the gender wage gap is big, there is an overall drop in home
labor and a couple devotes less time to having and raising children. However, when the
gender wage gap is fairly small and shrinks further, the rise in male time spent working
at home is almost big enough to keep total home labor constant. The reason for this
differential reaction to improvement in female relative wages is in the increasing marginal
disutility from working. Initially, specialization in the household meant a husband’s labor
supply was much higher than his wife’s, and therefore he was less willing to spend more
time on home production. But as relative wages become more equal, the spouses time
allocation, and thus their disutilities from working, are getting closer to each other, and
in the limit a drop in female home production is fully offset by men. To the extent
that disutilities from market and home labor are imperfect substitutes, this reallocation
of hours worked can be consistent with the couple’s utility cost of child care remaining
constant. On top of this, with the improvement in the wife’s earnings, a couple can acquire
more parental time saving inputs. Both the rise in male home labor and the higher use
of parental time-saving inputs into home production is what I find key in explaining the
flattening out of the total fertility rate.
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In a model extension I show that these results are robust to intrahousehold bargaining.
Calibrated against US data, my model suggests that for the trends in fertility changing
relative wages per se are much more important than their bargaining-induced shifts in
intrahousehold allocations.
Other papers that have studied the implications of the decline in the gender wage gap
for both male and female hours are Jones et al. (2003) and Knowles (2007), but none of
these papers has explored the implications for fertility. Galor and Weil (1996) present a
unified framework to explain the rise in female employment and the fall in fertility that
we observed until the mid 1970s. Since their mechanism links fertility decisions to the
market value of women’s disposable time9, it cannot explain why fertility stopped falling
when female wages continued improving. My model therefore highlights that the existing
literature that assumes perfect specialization within families, such that women shoulder
all of child care, has overlooked important implications of intrahousehold allocations.
2 The Model
2.1 Assumptions
I build a general equilibrium model of overlapping generations. Agents enter the economy
as young adults at age 20 and can have children in the first period of their lives, before
they turn 30. At age 60, agents retire, and they die deterministically at age 80. The
advantage of this modeling approach is that it incorporates an explicit age structure and
has implications for the demographic pyramid. Fertility leads to population growth and
thereby affects future labor markets and factor prices, and also social security benefits.
Moreover, I can feed in a life-cycle profile of wages which makes the model more realistic.
The complication with this approach is, I need to keep track of when children are born, as
this implies when they turn adults and leave their parent’s household. Thus, I assume for
tractability that each cohort can be represented by one representative household, formed
by a representative male and female, which can have a continuous number of children. Also
the length of the model period is motivated by tractability; a model period corresponds
to 10 years.
2.1.1 Agents and Households
All agents, men and women, derive utility from consumption of a market good (c) and
from having children (b), but derive disutility from working in the labor market (n) and
at home (h). They discount the future with factor β.
9Other papers linking fertility decisions to the market value of women’s disposable time include Green-
wood et al. (2005) and Doepke et al. (2007).
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Agents differ in terms of their gender (g ∈ {m, f}) and their age (j). I assume that all
economic active men and women live in couple households, formed by one man (‘husband’)
and one woman (‘wife’). Children live with their parents. In other words, when children
move out of their mother’s and father’s household, they find a spouse right away and
form a new couple household. To keep things simple I assume that both spouses are
of the same age and have the same deterministic life-span, which I denote by Tl. For
computational tractability, I assume that women, and hence couples, can have children
only in the first period of their (adult) life. I denote a couple’s total number of children
by b and the number of children living in their household by bh. I assume that children
leave the parental household after Ta periods. While parents derive utility from having a
child as long as they are alive themselves, households do not leave bequests, abstracting
from any further intergenerational altruism. Therefore agents start their economic-active
life (at age j = 1) with zero assets and leave no assets when they die (at age j = Tl).
Couples retire at age Tr, stop working in the market and receive social security benefits
Tss each period.
Let the absolute size of the cohort of couples of age j in period t be
St(j) (1)
In period t, the population share of the cohort aged j is then
µt(j) =
St(j)
Tl∑
k=1
St(k)
(2)
I apply a model of collective household behavior, as introduced by Chiappori (1988). The
male and the female partner have their own preferences, and derive felicity um and uf
respectively. Since they hold wealth jointly and might have children together, they solve a
joint maximization problem. In particular, the couple household solves a Pareto program
with relative weight θ attached to the husband’s and 1 − θ to the wife’s utility. In the
benchmark model, the household behaves as a unitary agent and θ = 0.5 throughout.
For the model with household bargaining, I assume that the Pareto weight is determined
through Nash bargaining over the surplus generated by marriage, where the threat point
of a spouse is not entering the marriage (at age j = 1). To simplify the computations, I
assume full-commitment such that the weights –once determined– remain constant over
a household’s lifetime and there is no divorce. In general, the outcome of the bargaining
depends on each partner’s relative outside option of staying single. Life-time utilities of
single men and women differ to the extent that they face different wages. The outcome
of the bargaining therefore depends on relative wages, and the Pareto weight (θ) is a
function of the gender wage gap over the couple’s life-time ({χt+j−1}Tlj=1).
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2.1.2 Fertility
Childbearing imposes a time-cost on the mother (τb), whereas child-care requires more
home production (x), which could be done by the father, the mother, or both.10. A further
input to home production are goods acquired in the market (e). Although I refer to this
home-labor saving input for simplicity as home appliances, in a more broader sense this
can also include paid domestic help, such as hiring nannies.
I assume that the amount of the home good needed is
x¯ = x¯(bh) with x¯
′(bh) > 0 (3)
Couples can have children only in the first period of their lives. Bearing a child reduces
the mother’s disposable time by τb in that period.
2.1.3 Household Production
Following Olivetti (2006) and Knowles (2007), I assume that the home good is produced
using a technology that is consistent with substitution among household member’s time
(h) and home appliances (e), which I model as a flow to simplify matters, according to
xh = e
γH1−γ
where home labor input is
H = zmhm + zfhf
and zm and zf are the male and female home labor productivities, respectively.
A change in spouse’s relative wages will have an effect on market hours, home hours,
as well as on home appliances used. Rising market wages could lead to increases in market
hours and decreases in home hours –such as we have observed in the data for married
females–, without a drop in home production, as the household can acquire more home
appliances. In other words, the technology allows, to some degree, for a marketization of
inputs to home production11.
The home good is non-storable and is a public good within the household.
2.1.4 Market Technology
Assume there is a final goods technology of the form
Yt = AK
α
t N
1−α
t (4)
10The former assumption is similar to Erosa et al. (2010), the latter is as in Knowles (2007) and similar
to Greenwood and Seshadri (2005)
11In a structural transformation framework, Ngai and Pissarides (2008) study substitutions between
home and market production, but do not distinguish between male and female labor.
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aggregating total market labor (N) and capital (K) into a final good which can be used for
consumption (c), investment in future capital stock, and for home appliances (e), which
I model as a flow to simplify matters. Capital depreciates at a rate δ each period.
The final goods sector is competitive. Factor prices are therefore equated to marginal
products, implying for the rental rate of capital (r) and wage rate per efficiency unit of
labor (w)
rt = αAK
α−1
t N
1−α
t − δ (5)
wt = (1− α)AKαt N−αt
2.1.5 Endowments and Markets
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time that they can split between working
in the market (n) and at home (h); the remainder is leisure. Since childbearing lowers a
woman’s effective time endowment (by τb), the male and female time constraints are
nm(j) + hm(j) ≤ 1 for j = 1,. . . ,Tl
nf (j) + hf (j) ≤
{
1 for j = 2,. . . ,Tl
1− τbb for j = 1
Since in the data there is a clear age-profile in wages, I assume an age-dependent
endowment of efficiency units of labor for men pm(j) and for women pf (j).
The model will imply for the wage of a woman of age j relative to a man of the
same age that
wf (j)
wm(j)
=
pf (j)
pm(j)
. A gender wage gap corresponds in the model therefore to
different labor productivities across gender. In reality, of course, differences in pay for
same occupation and similar qualifications may be the result of discrimination. One way of
rationalizing the simplifying modeling assumption of differential productivities is, because
of discrimination, women, with same abilities as men, have sorted into less productive
occupations. I will take women’s relative earnings, after controlling for observables such
as education, in year t from the data and denote this time-varying gender wage gap by
χt and impose pf,t(j) = χtpm(j).
Once agents have passed the retirement age Tr they can no longer generate labor
income which corresponds to pm(j) = pf (j) = 0 for j ≥ Tr. After retirement the couple
receives social security benefits Tss.
There is no uncertainty and agents’ income is not subject to shocks. Agents can trade
an asset with return rt. The economy is closed.
2.1.6 Preferences
Agents derive utility from consumption of the market good and enjoy having children,
but have disutility from working in the market or at home. In particular, assume that
9
preferences are additively separable and given by12
ug(c, n, h, b) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ −
(
φn
(
n1+η
1 + η
) s−1
s
+ φh
(
h1+ε
1 + ε
) s−1
s
) s
s−1
+ φb
b1−σb − 1
1− σb (6)
These preferences feature imperfect substitutability of disutilities of working in the
market or at home. I view it as realistic to allow the utility cost of these two very different
activities to differ, but nonetheless there is a relationship between the two: The marginal
disutility of supplying an additional hour of market work is increasing in the time worked
at home, and vice versa. These preferences allow for time allocations, consistent with
the data, such that both men and women work in the labor market and in the household
–even when male and female time are perfect substitutes.
I assume that there is a subsistence level in consumption of the home produced good.
A household needs to produce a certain amount of the home good x, which is increasing
in the number of children living in the household (bh). As a simplifying assumption,
following Knowles (2007), agents do not derive any further utility from home production,
and this constraint will be binding, x = x¯(bh).
2.1.7 Government
The government provides a pay-as-you go social security system. Similar to the US system,
it levies a constant social security tax τss on labor income and redistributes the proceeds
as benefits Tss to retired households. Hence
Tss,t = τss · wtNtTl∑
j=Tr
µ(j)
(7)
2.2 Couple Household’s Optimization
In the benchmark model I consider households in which spouses get equal weights (θ =
0.5), such that the household behaves like a unitary agent. Since I assume for the bargain-
ing model full commitment to the sharing rule determined when both partners meet (see
section 5.1), in both scenarios the Pareto weight θ is constant over the couple’s lifetime.
Consider the optimization problem of a couple household of age j with current wealth
a, total number of children b, of which bh are still living at home. Let ug(cg, ng, hg, b)
denote the own utility function of the member of gender g ∈ {m, f}. The household’s
resources from financial assets are a(1+r). Households before retirement can earn a labor
income net of taxes of w˜m(j)nm + w˜f (j)nf , where w˜m(j) = (1 − τss)pm(j)w is the net
12Adding utility from children in this additive form is generalizing Galor and Weil (1996) and Green-
wood and Seshadri (2005), who assume simply ln(b).
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male wage and w˜f (j) = χw˜m(j) the net female wage. After reaching the retirement age
(Tr) households receive social security benefits Tss.
After having decided at the beginning of their lives on the number of children (b), for
age j ≥ 2 the value functions of the representative couple household solves13
VC(a; b, j) = max
a′,e,cm,cf
nm,nf ,hm,hf
θum(cm, nm, hm, b) + (1− θ)uf (cf , nf , hf , b) +βVC(a′; b, j+ 1) (8)
subject to the constraint set:
a′ =
{
(1 + r)a+ w˜m(j)nm + w˜f (j)nf − cm − cf − e for j < Tr
(1 + r)a+ Tss − cm − cf − e for j ≥ Tr
(9)
x¯(bh) = e
γ (zmhm + zfhf )
1−γ (10)
bh(j) =
{
b for 1 ≤ j < Ta
0 for j > Ta
(11)
nm + hm ≤ 1 and nf + hf ≤ 1 (12)
VC(·;Tl + 1) = 0 and aTl+1 = 0 (13)
{wm(k), wf (k), r(k)}Tlk=j known (14)
In the first period of a household’s life, the value function is different. Then the couple
decides on the number of children (b), from which the parents will derive utility throughout
their lifetime. Since I am focusing on a representative couple, the household can choose
any non-negative continuous quantity. At model age j = 1, when the household starts
out and is without any assets (a = 0), the value function solves
VC(0; b; 1) = max
b,a′,e,cm,cf
nm,nf ,hm,hf
θum(cm, nm, hm, b) + (1− θ)uf (cf , nf , hf , b) + βVC(a′; b; 2) (15)
subject to the constraints (9) to (14), with the female time constraint (12) modified to be
nm + hm ≤ 1 and nf + hf ≤ 1− τbb (16)
since having children lowers the mother’s disposable time.
There is no closed form solution to this optimization problem, but the usual Euler
equations hold. Numerically, I solve a couple’s deterministic finite life-time optimization
problem (8) conditional on a fertility history backwards, making use of the intratemporal
first-order conditions, which I show in the appendix. Then I choose the number of children
that maximizes the couple’s life-time value function in the first period of their lives (15).
13To economize on notation, I do not index variables by time, but it should be understood that age (j)
takes on this intertemporal role.
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The optimal choice of number of children b is –off corners– such that
φbb
−σb
Tl∑
j=1
βj−1 =
θ
γ
Ta∑
j=1
βj−1cm(j; b)−σ
(
x¯(b)
zmhm(j; b) + zfhf (j; b)
) 1−γ
γ
x¯′(b) (17)
=
θ
zm
Ta∑
j=1
βj−1
(
φn
(
nm(j; b)
1+η
1 + η
) s−1
s
+ φh
(
hm(j; b)
1+ε
1 + ε
) s−1
s
) 1
s−1
φ˜hhm(j; b)
ζ x¯′(b)
=
1− θ
zf
Ta∑
j=1
βj−1
(
φn
(
nf (j; b)
1+η
1 + η
) s−1
s
+ φh
(
hf (j; b)
1+ε
1 + ε
) s−1
s
) 1
s−1
φ˜hhf (j; b)
ζ x¯′(b)
where φ˜h = φh(1 + ε)
1/s and ζ = (s−1)ε−1
s
.
Intuitively, when choosing a fertility plan the couple is outweighing benefits and costs
from having children. The marginal benefit of having this extra child arises from higher
felicity for the rest of couple’s lifetime, the left-hand side of (17). The marginal cost of
having more children lies in the need for more home production, for as long as the child
lives with the parents (Ta periods). To increase home production, the couple devotes
more time to home labor and uses more home appliances. Both adjustments reduce
consumption of the parents. As male and female home labor rises, the parents find it more
costly to supply as much labor to the market, and therefore generate less income. Since
home appliances are acquired in the market, disposable income for goods consumption
drops further. This marginal cost to the parents is, when time constraints are slack, the
right-hand side of (17). If a mother’s time constraint was binding, the time cost of having
the baby would have a further effect of lowering consumption, since she would have less
time to divide between market work and home production and loses earnings potential
(τbwf ).
2.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is an allocation of prices and quantities such that all couple households
are optimizing life-time utility, the representative firm maximizes profits, the government
budget balances, all market clears, and population growth is determined by past fertility
decisions. In particular, factor prices are determined competitively by (5), government
budget balances requires for social security (7), and households of all ages solve their
optimization problem (8) and (15), including the bargaining (31) when the household is
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formed. Moreover, factor markets clear according to14
Nt =
Tr∑
j=1
St(j) (pmnm,t(j) + pf (j)nf,t(j)) (18)
Kt =
Tl∑
j=1
St(j)at(j) (19)
and the size of cohorts of adult couples is given by
St(j) =

1
2
St−Ta(1)bt−Ta for j = 1
St−1(j − 1) for 2 ≤ j ≤ Tl
0 for j > Tk
(20)
On the right hand side the shift of Ta periods appears since children turn adult after
Ta periods and have been born when their parents where of age j = 1. The factor 1/2
in front reflects the fact that children born are half boys and half girls, and a couple
household consist of a man and a woman (of the same age). Notice that in this model the
population growth rate might change over time, which in turn affects the capital-labor
ratio.
The model implies for period t a working-age average male and female labor supply of
Nm,t =
TR−1∑
j=1
µ˜t(j)nm,t(j) (21)
Nf,t =
TR−1∑
j=1
µ˜t(j)nf,t(j) (22)
where µ˜t(j) = µt(j)/
(∑TR−1
k=1 µt(k)
)
is the mass of the aged j cohort relative to the
working-age population. Similarly, average (over all ages) home hours and appliances are
Hm,t =
Tl∑
j=1
µt(j)hm,t(j) (23)
Hf,t =
Tl∑
j=1
µt(j)hf,t(j) (24)
Et =
Tl∑
j=1
µt(j)et(j) (25)
14I solve for the equilibrium using a Auerbach and Koltikoff (1987) type algorithm. This entails 1.
guessing time-paths for aggregate state variables and thereby of factor prices, 2. solving the optimization
problems of all households given the guesses, 3. aggregating over all generations alive and computing the
deviations from the guessed paths, 4. If the deviations are sufficiently small, the equilibrium has been
found; if not, update the guesses and iterate until consistent.
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Since couples can have children only at the beginning of their adult lives, the total fertility
rate in period t is simply given by the number of children the representative household of
model age j = 1 has in that period
TFRt = bt (26)
3 Calibration
I choose parameters such that the model replicates in a base year the total fertility rate
and married male and married female hours worked, both at home and in the market. I
calibrate all parameters as time-invariant, and the only exogenous change over time is in
the gender wage gap. A model period is set to 10 years. I calibrate the model parameters
against data for 1965, taking the demographic structure of that year, the size of cohorts
and the population growth rate, as given. For the required amount of home production,
I make use of the cross-sectional variation of married men’s and women’s hours against
the number of children in the household. table 1 lists all model parameters, along with a
value taken from the literature15, or whether it is to be set in a calibration exercise.
In the literature the range of estimates of the labor share in home production is very
wide. Studies that include housing as capital or equipment used for home production
typically find a relatively low value, close to the one of market production, e.g. Greenwood
et al. (1995), while Benhabib et al. (1991), who exclude housing, estimate a very high
value of 0.92. In my model, the need for home production is at the margin entirely arising
from having children living in the household, and does not correspond closely to either
study. Since parents can acquire home production inputs in the market, such as hiring
nannies or paid domestic help, the share of time-saving inputs acquired in the market, γ,
should be higher than the Benhabib et al. (1991) value. As a benchmark I consider an
intermediate value of γ = 0.2, but I conduct a series of robustness checks, see section 7.
3.1 The Gender Wage Gap as Ratio of Residual Wages
To construct a series of the gender wage gap to feed into the model, I use data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the United States from 1968 to 2007.16First
I regress for individuals aged 20 to 59 the logarithm of real wages on a set of observables,
15As an approximation to the first order, the Frisch elasticity of market labor supply –when time-
constraints are slack– is 1η .
16In section A.4 of the appendix, I discuss the advantages of using data from the PSID, rather than
from the CPS, and compare the data and results from these two surveys.
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Description Value/Moment to Match
Preference Parameters
σ elasticity of consumption 1 (log-utility)
σb elasticity of demand for children calibration
η related to elasticity of market hours 2 (Domeij and Floden (2006))
ε related to elasticity of home hours calibration
s CES elasticity of disutilities to work calibration
φn weight on disutility market labor calibration
φh weight on disutility home labor calibration
φb weight on utility from children calibration
β discount factor 0.94710 (Cooley and Prescott (1995))
Market Technology
α capital share in market output 0.36 (Hansen (1985))
A total factor productivity 1 (normalization)
δ depreciation of capital 1− (1− 0.047)10 (Cooley and Prescott (1995))
pm(j) male wage profile estimated, see section 3.1
τss social security tax rate 11% (Heer and Maußner (2009))
Home Technology
γ share of market inputs in home 0.2 (and robustness checks)
zm male home labor productivity 1 (normalization)
zf female home labor productivity 1 (assuming zm = zf )
τb time cost on mother per child
1
2
1
10
(6 month)
x¯(bh) amount of home good needed cross-sectional variation
Time Variant
χt gender wage gap estimated, see section 3.1
Table 1: Model Parameters
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including most importantly education. In particular I estimate by OLS
logwi,t = β0,t + β1,tDfemalei,t + L(j) +Xi,tγ + i,t (27)
where Dfemalei,t =
{
1 if i is female
0 if i is male
L(j) is a polynomial in age
Xi,t is a vector of other observables, such as a polynomial
in years of education and race dummies
The estimated gender wage gap for year t, defined as the ratio of women’s to men’s
relative earnings not explained by Xi,t, is then given by e
β1,t . I give the full regression
results in appendix C.1, and plot the implied series in figure 3. To construct the series
of χt to feed into the model, where a period has a length of 10 years, I take the simple
averages.17 For the final steady state I assume that the gender wage gap is closed. I
impose for the transition periods between the last available data point and the steady
state, that χt grows at the same rate as over 1968–2007 until it reaches 1.
The estimates of equation 27 imply an age profile in wages, for male wages pm(j) =
exp(L(j)), which I illustrate in figure 5. Then I impose for females
pf,t(j) = χtpm(j) (28)
where I obtained χt as described above.
2.
5
3
3.
5
4
4.
5
20 30 40 50 60
Age
Age Profile of Wages
Figure 5: Age Profile of Wages
17As an alternative, I allow the gender wage gap to depend on time and age of the worker. The
qualitative results do not change; see appendix E.
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3.2 Home Production
To calibrate the required amount of home goods x¯(bh), notice that the model implies
that male and female home and market hours depend on the couple’s Pareto weights,
consumptions and the required amount of home good x¯(bh). In particular, at an interior
solution the household’s first order condition imply
x¯(bh) =
φh
φn
(
1 + ε
1 + η
)1/s
h
(s−1)ε−1
s
m
n
(s−1)η−1
s
m
w˜m
zm
γ
1− γ (zmhm + zfhf )
γ (29)
Conditional on all other parameters, this relationship can be used to back out of x¯(bh)
from the Aguiar and Hurst (2007) data, based on the American Time Use Survey. As a
functional form I assume
x¯(bh) = κ0 + κ1 · bκ2h (30)
and expect to find κ0 > 0, κ1 > 0 and 0 < κ2 < 1, which would mean home production is
always positive and increasing in number of children, but at a decreasing rate. I choose
the parameters κ0, κ1, κ2 to replicate the observed cross-sectional variation of married
men’s and women’s hours against the number of children in the household, according to
(29). The details are given in appendix C.2.
3.3 Remaining Parameters
1965-Moments to be Matched Data Fictive S.S. in Transition
Number of children (TFR) 2.913 2.9726 2.8493
Market hours of men 0.3886 0.3890 0.3907
Market hours of females 0.1120 0.1111 0.1139
Home hours men 0.0950 0.0950 0.0953
Home hours females 0.3896 0.3909 0.3893
Additional Target to be Matched
Long-run TFR 2 (assumed) 2.0312
For the 1965 moments, the first column shows the value of the statistics in the data. The
second column shows the model analogues, taking the demographics as given, when agents
believe the gender wage gap to remain constant forever. The third column shows the model
implied outcomes, when in 1965 agents learn the true future path of the gender wage gap. To
discipline the calibration a restriction on the long-run number of children is added. For the
long-run TFR, the last column shows the model’s final steady state TFR.
Table 2: Calibration Targets
Six parameters are left to be chosen, but I have only the five targets of table 2 to
match in 1965, the base year. Four parameters (φn, φh, ε, s) correspond to the targets for
male and female hours worked at home and in the market, and two parameters (φb, σb)
are key for the fertility choice.
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These parameters are, of course, calibrated jointly, but it is insightful to think of them
as being chosen to match particular moments in the data. Notice that the optimality con-
ditions for a household before retirement imply
(
hm(j)
hf (j)
) (s−1)ε−1
s
= zm
zf
χ(j)
(
nm(j)
nf (j)
) (s−1)η−1
s
.
Intuitively, given the gender wage gap and relative home productivities, s is chosen to
replicate the ratio of female to male labor supply. Then ε is set to match relative home
hours. Then φn and φh are chosen so that absolute male and female market and home
hours, respectively, equal the observed ones. Given these parameters, the cross-sectional
variation in hours worked against the number of children gives, according to (29), the pa-
rameters κ0, κ1, κ2, describing the required amount of home production x¯(bh). Finally, the
two parameters governing fertility have to be chosen. While φb captures the relative weight
the household attaches to having children (compared to consumption), σb essentially cap-
tures the curvature. I restrict the calibration by choosing σb such that in the final steady
state, the total fertility rate is approximately 2. A value of 2 seems natural, as the number
of children born is just replacing previous generations. Moreover, it is close to most recent
values for the US. Conditional on a value for σb, I calibrate the remaining five parameters
to the data of 1965 under the fiction that households believed gender wage gap to remain
constant forever. Then I solve the model for the final steady state, in which the gender
wage is closed. If the implied long-run fertility rate differs from 2, I update the guess
for σb until consistent. Table 3 shows the values found through this calibration exercise.
They imply for the required amount of home production x¯(bh) = 0.1813+0.0279(bh)
0.8845.
Description Value
σb elasticity of demand for children 0.3950
ε related to Frisch elasticity of home hours 3.5740
s CES elasticity of disutilities to work 1.4041
φn weight on disutility from market labor 2.6712
φh weight on disutility from home labor 1.8398
φb weight on utility from children 0.0515
Table 3: Calibrated Parameters
I perform a series of robustness checks, including alternative values for σb (and therefore
of φb), and report the model results under alternative parameters in section 7.
4 Results of the Benchmark Model
To obtain the transition path of the calibrated model, I feed the series of the observed
gender-wage gap into the model. For the first period I need initial conditions. I take the
demographic structure from the data. Since I do not have age-specific data on household
asset holdings for 1965, I initialize household asset holdings with the values of a fictive
18
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This graphs plots the representative couple household’s policy functions for assets, male and
female market and home hours, as well as number of children living at home, over the life-cycle,
from age j = 1 (20–29) to j = Tl = 6 (70–79).
Figure 6: Life-time Choices in the Initial Steady State
steady state in which agents believed the gender wage gap to remain constant forever.18
It should be stressed that in the model young couples, who are the ones deciding on
how many children to have, start out with zero assets. The initialization of asset holdings
applies to older households only, and could affect fertility only through general equilibrium
effects on wages or interest rates, which are likely to be small.
I assume that the economy will eventually reach a steady state in which male and
female wages are equalized. Since fertility is a choice in the model, the age distribution
evolves endogenously over time. Like Auerbach and Koltikoff (1987), I select the long-
run equilibrium such that in the final steady state the growth rate of the population is
constant. A constant number of children per couple is not enough to ensure this outcome,
as an infinite echoing series of baby booms or busts might occur. Since a balanced growth
path requires constant population growth to ensure a constant capital-labor ratio, I solve
for the final steady state by solving a fixed-point problem for the population growth rate.19
19
4.1 Comparing the Steady States
Figures 6 and 7 show the policy functions of the representative couple in the initial and in
the final steady state. In the initial steady state a couple has more than two children and
there is population growth. Therefore, there are relatively more young households in the
economy, who start out without any assets. As a consequence, the equilibrium interest
rate is such that β(1 + r) > 1, and consumption, both male and female, is increasing
over the household’s life-cycle. As consumption rises, an agent prefers to work less at a
given wage. However, holding consumption and home production constant, labor supply
increases in the wage rate. Since there is the age premium in wages (figure 5), these two
effects work against each other, resulting in the labor supply plotted in the graph.
In the initial steady state, the positive gender wage gap implies gains from specializa-
tion in the couple household. Consequently, a wife shoulders most of the housework, and
most of a couple’s labor supply is coming from the husband. In the final steady state, on
the other hand, the gender wage gap is closed, and there are no gains from specialization
anymore.20 Hours worked of men and women are therefore equalized, both in the market
sector and at home.
Comparing the policy functions of the final and the initial steady state shows, most
of the increase in female labor supply comes from young women, which is consistent with
the empirical findings by Buttet and Schoonbroodt (2006) and Olivetti (2006).
4.2 The Transition in the Benchmark Model
Figure 8 shows the transitional dynamics of the economy21, starting from an initial sit-
uation (t < 0), in which wages were expected to remain constant at their 1965 values.
Then at t = 0, corresponding to the year 1965, the true path of the gender wage gap gets
known, but relative wages do not start changing before t = 1, year 1975. The economy
starts to converge to a new steady state in which relative wages are equalized. During
the transition the gender wage gap, shown in the upper-left panel, closes gradually. As a
consequence, women work more hours in the market and less at home, whereas for men
the opposite happens. Initially, fertility is declining as raising children becomes more
18This is the fictive steady state used for calibrating the model against the data. The age-distribution
of 1965 is, however, not the stationary distribution, which would be implied by the population growth
rate of this year.
19First I guess a population growth rate, which implies a stationary age distribution. Then I compute
the steady state. In particular, the optimally chosen number of children, compared to the measure of
oldest households gives an implied population growth rate, according to (20). I iterate to find the fixed
point.
20By assumption male and female home productivities are equal throughout. Advances in technologies
over the last century, such as infant formula, have brought male and female productivities closer together.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2007) argue that this allowed female labor force participation to rise. In my
framework, it also implies a rise in male participation at home.
21The transitional graphs in the main text show, in the interest of brevity, only the behavior of aggregate
variables. Section D of the appendix shows the disaggregation by age.
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This graphs plots the representative couple household’s life-cycle policy functions for assets,
male and female market and home hours, as well as number of children living at home, under
the prices of the final steady state. Since the gender wage gap is closed, hours worked of men
and women coincide.
Figure 7: Life-time Choices in the Final Steady State
costly to the parents.
What is striking in the transition process is that fertility flattens out before the gender
wage gap is closed (at the blue dashed line). While the gender wage gap is closing, the
model implies a reallocation of labor across gender. When female wages rise, a household
finds it optimal to increase the wife’s labor supply and to decrease her time working
at home. However, since relative wages have changed, but not relative productivities
at home, this reallocation entails an increase in men’s home production. In all periods,
the couple also acquires more home appliances to substitute for the overall drop of their
time working at home. However, the link between higher female relative wages and lower
fertility breaks at some point.
The change in relative wages alters the environment in which the couple makes its
economic decisions. Initially, when the gender wage gap is big, there is a great degree of
specialization in the household, resulting in a husband working substantially more in the
labor market than his wife, but much less at home. In this situation, due to increasing
marginal disutility from working, a husband is not prepared to put in much more time
at home when his wife works more hours in the market. A rise in female relative wages
directly increases female labor supply, and lowers female, as well as total, time spent on
home production. As the couple devotes less time to having children, fertility falls sharply,
despite the rise in home appliances. However, in later periods when the gender wage gap
is fairly small, the spouses time allocation and, thus, their disutilities from working are
very similar. When then the wage gap shrinks further, the rise in male home hours is, at
21
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This graphs shows the benchmark model’s transition over time, that is implied by the narrowing
of the gender wage gap (upper-left panel). The dotted lines show the data, which is available
until 2005 (t = 5) only.
Figure 8: Transition Path of the Unitary Model (θ = 0.5)
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a given level of home production, i.e. number of children, almost big enough to keep total
home labor constant; in the limit of equalized wages, a drop in female home production
is fully offset by men. On top of this, with the improvement in the wife’s earnings, the
couple can acquire more parental time saving inputs.
For the optimal choice on how many children to have, however, the couple outweighs
the benefits from having an additional child with the utility cost of child care. The
reallocation of a man’s time from market to home, which comes with the change in relative
wages, might actually reduce his marginal cost of having an additional child, although
his share of child care rises, since the disutilities are imperfect substitutes and his initial
time allocation was very unbalanced. Similarly, a mother’s marginal cost might increase,
fall, or not be affected at all. The model results clearly suggest that for the first part
of the transition, as female relative wages improve, the parents’ marginal utility cost is
increasing, and therefore they prefer to have fewer children. But when the gender wage
gap is sufficiently small and shrinks further, their marginal cost is not affect, resulting in
a constant fertility rate.
I will show in the next two sections that key in understanding why fertility did not
fall further is the rise in male home labor, that we have observed in the data. While
qualitatively the rise in male participation in home production can yield a flattening
out of the fertility rate, I find that the higher use of parental time-saving inputs into
home production is important in matching the timing. However, a marketization of home
production alone is not sufficient to explain the data.
4.3 Counterfactual: The Absence of Male Home Labor
In this part I am shutting down the rise of male home labor. In the existing literature
on fertility it is commonly assumed that child-care is a function of female time only. By
setting male home productivity to zero, my model nests this as a special case. Notice
that in this counterfactual exercise, men and women do not become ‘identical’ in the
final steady state. Although their wages will eventually be equalized, specialization in the
household persists because of the different home productivities.
Not to confound changes in technology with changes in preferences, I keep all pref-
erence parameters at their baseline values, but set zm = 0 and adjust zf such that the
household still chooses in 1965 the same number of children as in the data.22 Figure 9
shows the transition of the model, when men cannot counteract the fall in women’s home
hours.
It implies a monotone drop in fertility as long as female wages catch up– which is
inconsistent with the data. Throughout the transition, parents are having fewer and
22Since by assumption of zm = 0 this model variant is doomed to fail along the dimension of male
home hours, notice that I could not apply the calibration strategy of the benchmark model, which has
Hm as one of the targets.
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For the model without male home production, this graphs plots the transition implied by the
narrowing of the gender wage gap (upper-left panel) over time. The dotted lines show the
data, which is available until 2005 (t = 5) only.
Figure 9: Transition Path of the Unitary Model (θ = 0.5) with zm = 0
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For model without male home production under the alternative calibration, this graphs plots
the transition implied by the narrowing of the gender wage gap (upper-left panel) over time.
The dotted lines show the data, which is available until 2005 (t = 5) only.
Figure 10: Transition of the Unitary Model (θ = 0.5) with zm = 0, Alternative Calibration
fewer children, since child-care hours continue to fall, when women’s market labor supply
rises. As women’s income increase, couples also acquire more home appliances, but this
marketization of home production is not strong enough to prevent fertility from falling.
Only once the gender wage gap has closed, the optimal number of children stabilizes.
4.3.1 Alternative Calibration of the Model without Male Home Production
As an alternative calibration for the zm = 0-model, I adjust the parameters capturing
the choice of number of children, such that also this model variant has a total fertility
rate of 2 in the final steady state. More specifically, I take the benchmark calibration,
with zm = 0 and zf = 1, and adjust (φb, σb) to target a long-run TFR of 2, but keeping
1965’s TFR at the observed value. Given all other parameters from the benchmark, this
adjustment yields φb = 0.0872 and σb = 0.9625. Then I solve for the transition of the
model under this alternative calibration and show the results in figure 10. Also under
these alternative parameters, the model without male home production predicts that the
total fertility rate falls as long as the gender wage gap shrinks. That parents use more
market inputs into home production is not sufficient for generating a flattening out of the
fertility rate before the gender wage gap has closed.
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To conclude, in the benchmark model of above, it is the rise in male home labor, which
counteracts the fall of female time inputs into child raising, that is key in understanding
why the fertility decline ended.
4.4 No Marketization of Home Production
Since the previous section concludes that the rise in male home production is important
in understanding why fertility did not fall further, one might wonder whether the mar-
ketization of home production matters for the trends in fertility after all. As I show in
this section, that parents can use more time-saving inputs at home when female wages
rise, is not crucial for replicating the flattening out of the total fertility rate qualitatively.
However, it is important in matching the timing.
To rule out marketization of home production, consider a simpler version of the model
in which home production is a function of male and female home hours only. This is the
special case of γ = 0. I use the same calibration strategy as for the benchmark model, in
order to give both models equal chances in matching the data.23
Figure 11 shows the transition of this model variant. Also the model without marketi-
zation predicts that fertility stops falling before the gender wage gap is closed (in t = 10,
at the dashed line). This shows that the reallocation of men’s time from market to home,
and of women’s time from home to the labor market is, in principle, sufficient in breaking
the direct link between higher female wages and fewer children. However, this version of
the model predicts that fertility does not flatten out before the year 2025 (t = 7), but in
the data the fertility rate has been constant already since the late 1970s. The benchmark
model featuring marketization of home production, on the other hand, gets closer and
predicts, as shown in figure 8, a flat fertility rate since 1995 (t = 4). In section 6, below,
I compare the different versions of the model and the data in greater detail.
23The same calibration strategy as for the benchmark model gives the following parameters:
σb = 0.750, ε = 3.4935, s = 1.4073, φn = 2.6281, φh = 1.8434, φb = 0.0524 implying x¯(bh) =
0.3762 + 0.0515(bh)
0.9254. They imply for the targets:
1965-Moments to be Matched Data Fictive S.S. in Transition
Number of children (TFR) 2.913 2.9134 2.7982
Market hours of men 0.3886 0.3890 0.3949
Market hours of females 0.1120 0.1104 0.1159
Home hours men 0.0950 0.0711 0.0715
Home hours females 0.3896 0.3630 0.3616
Additional Target to be Matched
Long-run TFR 2 (assumed) 2.0279
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For the model without marketization, this graphs plots the transition implied by the narrowing
of the gender wage gap (upper-left panel) over time. The dotted lines show the data, which is
available until 2005 (t = 5) only.
Figure 11: Transition Path of the Unitary Model (θ = 0.5) with γ = 0
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5 The Bargaining Model
Since Feyrer et al. (2008) have argued that changes in women’s household status is impor-
tant in explaining the time series in total fertility, I introduce next household bargaining.
The only modification to the benchmark model is that now the Pareto weights in the
household’s optimization program are determined endogenously.
Here, rising relative wages also improve women’s say in household decision making,
which corresponds in my model to a higher weight on women’s utility in a couple’s op-
timization program. I assume that this weight is the result of a Nash bargaining over
the surplus generated by marriage. The wife’s bigger say reduces her share of housework,
relative to her husband, by more than what a change in relative wages per se would imply.
5.1 Determination of Intrahousehold Weights
The solution to the couple’s optimization program at a given Pareto weight θ defines a
sequence of life-time utilities {VC,m(j|χ, θ), VC,f (j|χ, θ)}Tlj=1 for the man and the woman
who form the household. I follow McElroy and Horney (1981) and assume that the sharing
rule θ is the result of Nash Bargaining. When both partners meet at the beginning of their
adult lives, i.e. at model age j = 1, they bargain under full commitment over the surplus
generated from marriage. The threat point of each partner is staying single, rather than
entering the match. In equilibrium, the weights are then the solution to
θ = arg max
θ˜
[VC,m(1|χ, θ˜)− VS,m(1|χ)][VC,f (1|χ, θ˜)− VS,f (1|χ)] (31)
where VC,m(1|χ, θ˜) and VC,f (1|χ, θ˜) are the husband’s and wife’s lifetime utilities at age
j = 1 that are implied by the joint optimization program, and Vm,S(1|χ) and Vf,S(1|χ)
are the life-time utilities if the man or the women stayed single (at age j = 1), given the
series of the gender pay gap that they face over their lives (χ ={χj}Tlj=1 = { wf (j)wm(j)}
Tl
j=1).
To find the value of the threat points, consider the optimization problem of male and
female singles. Since they cannot have children, the value function of a single agent of
28
gender g ∈ {m, f} solves
VS,g(a; j) = max
c,,n,h,e,a′
u(c, n, h, 0) + βVS,g(a
′; j + 1) for j ≥ 1 (32)
subject to
a′ =
{
(1 + r)a+ w˜g(j)n− c− e for j < Tr
(1 + r)a+ Tss
2
− c− e for j ≥ Tr
x¯(0) = eγH1−γ with H = zgh
n+ h ≤ 1
VS,g(·;Tl + 1) = 0 and a1 = Tl+1 = 0
{wg(k), r(k)}Tlk=j known
I find the singles’ value function at age j = 1 numerically. Then I solve the Nash
bargaining problem (31) to find a household’s Pareto weight. The resulting sharing rule
depends on the life-time series of the gender wage gap (θ = θ(χ)), since it changes the
outside option of females relative to males. In other words, the spouse’s bargaining
position depends on their relative wages. Typically the husband’s weight is increasing in
his relative life-time wages.
5.2 Dependence on the Weights
A rise in wives’ Pareto weights, relative to their husbands, –a drop in θ– makes them
better off through a intrahousehold reallocation of consumption and hours worked. One
optimality condition that is particular useful in illustrating the mechanism of the model
is the ratio of male to female home hours. When both time constraints (12) are slack, the
optimal division of home labor for retired couples is given by24
hm
hf
=
(
1− θ
θ
zm
zf
)1/ε
for j ≥ Tr (33)
Increase in women’s relative Pareto weight imply an increase in the share of men’s
home hours. Numerically I find that this also the case for working-age couples. An
improvement in a woman’s bargaining position therefore decreases her share of home
hours and lowers her opportunity cost of having children. However, as her partner then
has to contribute more to home production, his preferred number of children is falling.
24One can show that as sl →∞, making the choice of home and market hours separable, the optimality
condition (33) also holds for working-age couples.
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5.3 Calibration
As for the benchmark model in section 3, I calibrate the model with intrahousehold
bargaining against data for 1965. I report the obtained parameter values in table 4, and
the targets and their counterparts in the model table 5. The calibrated parameters imply
for the required amount of home production x¯(bh) = 0.1923 + 0.0299(bh)
0.8793.
Description Value
σb elasticity of demand for children 0.4800
ε related to Frisch elasticity of home hours 4.1041
s CES elasticity of disutilities to work 1.3673
φn weight on disutility from market labor 2.3727
φh weight on disutility from home labor 2.4044
φb weight on utility from children 0.0764
Table 4: Calibrated Parameters for the Bargaining Model
1965-Moments to be Matched Data Fictive S.S. in Transition
Number of children (TFR) 2.913 2.8371 3.0463
Market hours of men 0.3886 0.3889 0.3941
Market hours of females 0.1120 0.1111 0.1008
Home hours men 0.0950 0.0948 0.0902
Home hours females 0.3896 0.3885 0.4001
Additional Target to be Matched
Long-run TFR 2 (assumed) 2.0205
For the 1965 moments, the first column shows the value of the statistics in the data. The
second column shows the model analogues, taking the demographics as given, when agents
believe the gender wage gap to remain constant forever. The third column shows the model
implied outcomes, when in 1965 agents learn the true future path of the gender wage gap. To
discipline the calibration a restriction on the long-run number of children is added. For the
long-run TFR, the last column shows the model’s final steady state TFR.
Table 5: Calibration Targets for the Bargaining Model
5.4 Steady State Comparison
Table 6 shows the model implied variables for the 1965-steady state, taking the age
distribution as given, and the final steady state with endogenous distribution across age.
The steady state results of the bargaining model, rows 1 and 2, confirm, improvement in
women’s relative wages lead to a reduction in men’s Pareto weight in household decision
making. In the final steady state, in which the gender wage gap is assumed to have
disappeared, both spouses have an equal weight in the household optimization (θ = 0.5),
whereas initially, when men earned relatively more, husbands accrued a bigger weight.
Not surprisingly, in response to higher wages, female labor supply increases and
women’s share of home production decreases. Fertility is lower in the long run, when
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χ µ(j) θ TFR Nm Nf Hm Hf
0.602 1965 data endogenous 0.612 2.8371 0.3889 0.1111 0.0948 0.3885
1.000 endogenous endogenous 0.500 2.0205 0.2972 0.2972 0.2254 0.2254
1.000 endogenous fixed at 0.612 2.0884 0.2407 0.3600 0.2351 0.2158
Table 6: Steady States Comparisons
the gender wag gap has closed. In the bargaining model there are three forces driving
fertility decisions. Firstly, higher wages exert a positive income effect increasing a couple’s
desire to have children. Secondly, higher relative earnings to women affect the division
of market and home labor between men and women. In particular, men have to con-
tribute more to home production, leaving women with more disposable time, which tends
to boost fertility. Thirdly, however, the bargaining effect has differential effects on men
and women. While a higher Pareto weight on females increases the number of children a
mother wants to have, it reduces the optimal number for men, who will need to provide
more input to child care.
To disentangle the effects, I conduct a counterfactual exercise. I vary women’s relative
wages, but keep the Pareto weights constant. The last row of table 6 shows the steady state
results under a fixed weight of θ = 0.612, which was found to be optimal under χ = 0.602.
Comparing them with the row above highlights the role of household bargaining: Under
my calibration, household bargaining reduces fertility in the final steady state. While the
improvement in women’s say in the household, which comes along with the shrinking of
the gender wage gap, increases their preferred number of children, it reduces the optimal
number of children for fathers, who need to work more and more at home due the mothers’
bigger say. The number of children the couple chooses is in between the optimal numbers
for both spouses. Overall I find that when female relative wages are high and women’s
Pareto weights increase, fertility drops. The intuition is that higher relative female wages
per se imply that, optimally, a husband provides more home hours. When in addition the
husband’s relative weight falls, he needs to supply yet more home hours, which reduces
his utility substantially. Consequently, the higher female relative wages are, the faster
the male preferred number of children drops; they prefer reducing home production over
having more children. Wives do prefer to have more children in this case, but the increase
in their weight in the household optimization is not strong enough to overcome the drop
in husbands’ optimal number of children.
Thus, bargaining adds a third force on fertility: When higher female relative wages
decrease a father’s bargaining position, he does not want to have as many additional
children, as he would have desired if his Pareto weight had remained constant. For women,
bargaining has the opposite effect. As their weight increases, their optimal number of
children does not fall by as much in response to higher female wages. These two opposing
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This graphs plots the transition of the model with intrahousehold bargaining. The gender wage
gap (upper-left panel) closes exogenously over time. As a consequence the husband’s relative
Pareto weight, shown for newly matched households (age j = 1), falls (upper-right panel). The
dotted lines show the data, which is available until 2005 (t = 5) only.
Figure 12: Transition Path of the Bargaining Model
forces lead to a hump-shape in the household’s fertility choice against the female’s relative
Pareto weight.
5.5 The Transition Path
Figure 12 shows the transitional dynamics of the economy in the presence of intrahouse-
hold bargaining. As the gender wage gap closes, the husband’s relative weight in household
decision declines, until in the final steady state with equalized wages both spouses have
equal say and θ = 0.5. Notice that at t = 0 households learn the true future path of the
gender wage gap, but relative wages do not start changing before t = 1. Since Pareto
weights depend on life-time relative wages, the improvement in the wife’s relative wages
reduces the newly-matched husband’s Pareto weight, already in t = 0. This bargaining
effect increases female relative consumption, and ceteris paribus reduces her hours worked.
The reallocation of home hours from women to men is therefore stronger than what is
explained by changes in relative wages per se.
To further investigate how bargaining affects the transition, I conduct again a coun-
terfactual experiment. I take the bargaining model under the same calibration, but keep
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the Pareto weights artificially at their initial 1965 level. The implied transition path is
shown in figure 13. The same income and substitution effects are at work, but only in
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This graphs plots the hypothetical transition if men’s Pareto weight remained at their initial
level. The gender wage gap (upper-left panel) closes exogenously over time. The dotted lines
reproduce the transition path of the model with bargaining-determined Pareto weights.
Figure 13: Counterfactual Transition: Holding Pareto Weight Constant
figure 12, here reproduced by the dotted lines, the bargaining effect is present. With
household bargaining, in response to higher relative wages, women get a bigger say in
decision making, and their husbands’ relative weights decline. As a consequence, men’s
share of housework rises by more than what is explained by relative wages alone. Since
initially home hours differ a lot by gender, men’s disutility from putting in more time at
home is relatively small, but the marginal gains to women is big. The couple finds it,
therefore, optimal to have more children when bargaining shifts the burden of housework
towards men. Thus, when the gender wage gap is big and consequently home hours very
unequal, intrahousehold bargaining tends to boost fertility. However, when home hours
are already rather equal because the gender wage gap is fairly small, bargaining effect has
the opposite effect on fertility. Rising relative female wages per se imply that, optimally,
a husband provides more home hours. When in addition the husband’s relative weight
falls, he needs to supply yet more home hours, which reduces his utility substantially.
Consequently, the higher female relative wages are, the faster drops the male preferred
number of children; they prefer reducing home production over having more children.
Wives do prefer to have more children in this case, but the increase in their weight in the
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household optimization is not strong enough to overcome the drop in husband’s optimal
number of children.
While initially, when the gender wage gap is big, the bargaining effect leads to higher
fertility, in the longer run it lowers fertility. Overall, I find, however, that the effect of
intrahousehold bargaining on fertility is rather small, and the behavior of fertility over
time is, qualitatively, as in the benchmark model.
6 Confronting the Models and the Data
In this section, I compare the predictions of the different versions of the model to each
other and to the observed variation in the data. Table 7, lists the relative changes from
1965 to 2005, and figure 14 shows the transition paths of the various models and the data
for married men and women.
Data Model
Married only All Individuals Benchmark zm = 0 γ = 0 Bargaining
TFR −35.3 (US-born mothers) −28.4 −45.9 −20.9 −33.6
Nm −5.6 −7.3 −10.7 −5.1 −10.6 −12.1
Nf +109 +87.5 +70.3 +114.3 +56.4 +104.3
Hm +70.8 +61.2 +55.7 0 +70.8 +62.3
Hf −24.5 −27.6 −20.6 −12.2 −16.8 −23.6
‘RSS’, 1
5
∑5
i=1(m
model
i −mdatai )2, against
data for married only 0.0355 0.0923 0.0647 0.0023
data for all individuals 0.0087 0.0962 0.0280 0.0065
‘Normalized RSS’, 1
5
∑5
i=1(
mmodeli −mdatai
mdatai
)2, against
data for married only 0.4240 0.2843 0.4788 0.5805
data for all individuals 0.0735 0.3166 0.1361 0.1022
Hm and Hf correspond to the Aguiar and Hurst (2007) data for 2003. TFR in 2005 is based
on my calculations for TFR of US-born women only, but for 1965 it is for the entire US
population. The error due to data limitations is likely to be small, as in the 1970s US-born
TFR was closely following the aggregate. I also do not have enough information to decompose
fertility into wedlock and out-of-wedlock births. The mi in the success measures are the relative
changes from 1965 to 2005 in TFR, Nm, Nf , Hm , Hf .
Table 7: Relative Changes (%) over 1965–2005
The benchmark model performs better than the model version ruling out male partic-
ipation at home (zm = 0), and than the version not allowing for marketization of home
production (γ = 0). But qualitatively all models with male home production are quite
successful. They imply (i) that the fertility rate should stabilize before the gender wage
gap is closed, and (ii) a secular rise in men’s time devoted to home production. The
zm = 0−model, on the other hand, fails in generating a flattening-out of fertility before
34
1975 1995 2015 2035 2055
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
Female Relative Wages
1975 1995 2015 2035 2055
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
TFR
 
 
Benchmark
z
m
=0
γ=0
Barg.
Data
1975 1995 2015 2035 2055
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Labor Supply
1975 1995 2015 2035 2055
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Home Hours
Figure 14: Comparing the Models and the Data
the gender wage gap has closed. This suggests that key in understanding why fertility
did not fall further, despite female wages kept improving, is the rise of male home labor.
However, all models predict that fertility would flatten out much later than observed
in the data. In the benchmark model, the optimal number of children per couple stabilizes
in 1995, but in the data the total fertility rate is virtually flat since the late 1970s.25 In
the model with γ = 0, which does not allow for marketization of home production or child
care, fertility stabilizes even later. It also understates the rise in female labor supply, but
overstates the number of children per couple.
Thus, quantitatively, both the rise of male time and the acquisition of time-saving
inputs into home production are important in understanding why the fertility decline
came to halt. Comparing the γ = 0−model to the benchmark, which uses γ = 0.2, also
suggests, that the higher the share of market inputs into child care, the earlier fertility
flattens out. In the next section I conduct a series of robustness checks, including this
parameter.
25The reason for this timing failure of the model could be that the gender wage gap closes faster for
young women, who just enter the labor market, than for older women. But since it is young couples who
have children, the benchmark calibration which uses the average gender wage gap might understate the
speed of the transition.
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7 Robustness Checks
σb = 0.25 σb = 0.3 σb = 0.395 σb = 0.6
Final Steady State
TFR 1.80 1.902 2.031 2.227
Nm 0.292 0.290 0.288 0.285
Nf 0.292 0.290 0.288 0.285
Hm 0.229 0.229 0.228 0.228
Hf 0.229 0.229 0.228 0.228
This table shows the final steady states of the different versions of the model, that are calibrated
individually. The calibration follows section 3, but uses ad-hoc values for σb, rather than
targeting a long-run TFR. The benchmark model is the one with σb = 0.395.
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis: Varying σb
First, I perform a series of robustness checks on σb, which relates to the elasticity of
utility with respect to children. For the benchmark model I chose σb to target a long-run
total fertility rate of 2. Now I am lifting this restriction, and use various ad-hoc values
for σb. All other parameters are chosen under the calibration strategy of section 3, using
γ = 0.2 as in the benchmark. Table 8 shows the resulting final steady states. The higher
σb, the higher is fertility in the final steady state, and the less fertility declines during the
transition. To replicate the steep decline in TFR of the 1960s, however, the model needs
a value for σb that is not too high. A very low value of σb, on the other hand, would imply
a lower TFR than observed most recently. All values, however, do imply a flattening out
of fertility before the gender wage gap is closed.
γ = 0 γ = 0.08 γ = 0.2
Final Steady State
TFR 2.027 1.99 2.031
Nm 0.281 0.285 0.288
Nf 0.281 0.285 0.288
Hm 0.205 0.235 0.228
Hf 0.205 0.235 0.228
Relative Changes (%) over 1965–2005
TFR −20.9 −23.4 −28.4
Nm −10.6 −9.2 −10.7
Nf +56.4 +65.2 +70.3
Hm +70.8 57.7 +55.7
Hf −16.8 −18.37 −20.6
This table shows the calibrated models’ final steady states and the implied changes over 1965–
2005. The models are calibrated individually, using the strategy outlined in section 3. The
baseline model has γ = 0.2.
Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis: Varying γ
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Figure 15: Sensitity Analysis: Varying γ
Next, I conduct a sensitivity analysis for the share of market inputs into home pro-
duction, γ, since in the literature the range of estimates is wide, and in my model the
interpretation of γ should include all market inputs into home production, not only ap-
pliances. In the benchmark model I set γ = 0.2, which is much bigger than the estimate
of 0.08 by Benhabib et al. (1991) to allow for a greater marketization of child care, but
below the upper-end value of Greenwood et al. (1995), who include housing capital and
conclude that market inputs’ share into home production does not differ from the capital
share in market output (γ = α). Since in my model home production is at the margin
varying only with child care, which requires mainly human time, I work with a (γ < α).
In section 4.4, I have already shown the transition of the model with γ = 0. As a further
sensitivity analysis, I also calibrate models based different values for γ, and solve their
transition to steady state. Figure 15 and table 9 summarize the findings. The higher γ,
the earlier the fertility rate stabilizes, bringing the model closer to the data.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper I argue that the common force behind the observed trends in fertility and
hours worked is the narrowing of the gender wage gap. I present a general equilibrium
model in which having children increases the need for home production, and in which
rising female relative wages have not only direct effects on employment, but also reallocate
hours worked at home from women to men. Initially, because of the gender wage gap,
women shoulder most of home production. When the wage gap shrinks, women’s labor
supply increases and total home production falls. Men, whose labor supply is much
higher than their wives, are because of increasing disutility from working not willing
to fully offset the drop in women’s time working at home. As a consequence fertility
falls. However, the smaller the gender wage gap is, the less of an effect there is on total
home production, as the scope for specialization in the household decreases. Because
of imperfect substitutability between the disutilities from working at home and in the
market, the marginal utility cost of having an additional child can become constant when
female relative wages are still improving, despite the change in hours worked, and fertility
can remain flat.
Qualitatively the model predictions are consistent with the data: after an initial steep
decline, fertility stabilizes before the gender wage gap has fully closed. The model also
implies the secular rise of male home production and a fall in female time spent working
at home. However, the model generates the flattening out of the total fertility rate
later than observed in the data. While qualitatively the rise in male participation in
home production can yield a flattening out of the fertility rate, I find that a higher use of
parental time-saving inputs into home production helps in matching the timing. However,
a marketization of home production alone is not sufficient. Both the rise in male home
production and marketization are key in explaining why fertility did not decline to even
lower levels.
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A More on the Data
A.1 Fertility
The aggregate data for the US exhibits a U-shape with an incline in total fertility rate
since the late 1970s. But over the last decades there has been a dramatic rise in the
fraction of births to immigrant mothers. While in 1970 foreign-born mothers accounted
for 7.2% of all births, in 2008 they account for 24.4%, as the Vital Statistics of the United
States indicate. Since immigrant women have more children than the native population
(in recent years), one might wonder whether the recovery of aggregate US fertility is
not purely driven by the effects of immigration - which is outside of my model. Thus,
I construct a series of total fertility rate for US-born women only. I take data from the
US Vital Statistics, which, since 1970 (but not in 1972) lists live births by the mother’s
birthplace and five-year age brackets. To obtain age-specific birthrates by immigration
status, I then divide the number of live births by the corresponding number of women in
the population, for which I use IPUMS data (Census and American Community Survey)
with linear interpolation between collection years. Finally I calculate the total fertility
rates for the two groups by adding up the age-specific birthrates and multiplying by
5, as the age brackets are of five years width. As a consistency check, I do the same
calculations for all women in the population, i.e. independent of their immigration status,
and compare the constructed series to the official total fertility data. The two series align
almost perfectly. Figure 16 shows the resulting breakdown. While in the aggregate US
data total fertility has been rising since the late 1970s, this is mostly accounted for by a
rise of births to immigrant mothers. Over that period, fertility of the native population
has shown only a very modest incline, and has practically been flat. Fertility trends in
most European countries have been very similar to the US. In figure 17 I show the total
fertility rate for 20 European countries. These are the official numbers as published by
Eurostat; for these countries I cannot construct a measure for fertility of native women
only due to a lack of data.
A.2 Time Spent on Home Production
To highlight trends in home production, I use data from Aguiar and Hurst (2007), based
on the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Unfortunately the survey questionnaire in
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Figure 17: Total Fertility Rates in Europe
1993 did not ask for the family structure of respondents, such as marital status or number
of children. Hence I drop 1993 from my analysis. Next, I need to define what activities
asked from ATUS to include as home hours.
I start with the definitions of activities Aguiar and Hurst (2007) made:
1. ‘Basic Child Care’ (what Aguiar and Hurst call child care basic). This excludes
time spent on teaching (in a broad sense) and playing with a child.
2. ‘Full Child Care’ (what Aguiar and Hurst call child care full) includes also teaching
and playing with children.
3. ‘Home Production’, which is sum of time spent on preparing meals, housework,
home and car maintenance, gardening and pet care and other domestic duties.
4. ‘Non-Market Work’ defined as ‘Home Production’ plus time spent on obtaining
goods.
5. My own and preferred indicator ‘Non-Market Work including Basic Child Care’,
which I construct as ‘Non-Market Work’ plus ‘Basic Child Care’.
In all statistics and regressions with the dataset I make use of the adjusted weights
that Aguiar and Hurst (2007) provide. While the ATUS was designed to be nationally
representative when started in 1965, in subsequent years the survey provides weights for
respondents. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) adjust these weights for the number of working
days within the interview periods, as the survey asks for activities undertaken within a
given week.
All five measures of home hours show the same trend as in figure 4 over time: a secular
decline for women and a rise for men. This robustness across the different measures is
confirmed in OLS regressions for data on married respondents in 1965, 1975, 1985 and
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Regressions of Non-Market Hours of Married Males and Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Basic Full Home Non-Market Non-Market
Child Care Child Care Production Work +Basic Child Care
Dummy Year 1975 -1.691*** -1.629*** -5.533*** -6.386*** -8.077***
(0.353) (0.405) (0.888) (0.985) (1.065)
Dummy Year 1985 -0.252 0.290 -7.293*** -7.215*** -7.467***
(0.334) (0.394) (0.727) (0.828) (0.914)
Dummy Year 2003 0.797*** 2.302*** -10.68*** -11.40*** -10.60***
(0.304) (0.355) (0.644) (0.729) (0.801)
Dummy 1975× Male 2.887*** 2.580*** 8.158*** 8.700*** 11.59***
(0.429) (0.492) (1.062) (1.227) (1.324)
Dummy 1985× Male 1.934*** 1.671*** 14.06*** 14.22*** 16.15***
(0.378) (0.455) (0.897) (1.050) (1.140)
Dummy 2003× Male 1.916*** 1.456*** 16.53*** 17.11*** 19.02***
(0.350) (0.417) (0.758) (0.889) (0.973)
Dummy Male -5.111*** -5.436*** -25.52*** -28.11*** -33.22***
(0.296) (0.348) (0.658) (0.782) (0.857)
Number of Kids in Hh 2.323*** 3.111*** 2.306*** 2.422*** 4.745***
(0.140) (0.168) (0.302) (0.346) (0.378)
(Number of Kids in Hh)2 -0.182*** -0.274*** -0.168*** -0.192*** -0.374***
(0.0319) (0.0378) (0.0571) (0.0649) (0.0742)
Age -0.919*** -0.864*** -0.396 -0.463 -1.382***
(0.134) (0.157) (0.341) (0.383) (0.417)
Age2 0.0160*** 0.0141*** 0.0108 0.0129 0.0289***
(0.00270) (0.00317) (0.00732) (0.00819) (0.00885)
Age3 -8.86e-05*** -7.41e-05*** -6.27e-05 -8.06e-05 -0.000169***
(1.69e-05) (2.00e-05) (4.90e-05) (5.47e-05) (5.88e-05)
Constant 19.36*** 19.62*** 29.32*** 37.03*** 56.39***
(2.095) (2.418) (4.837) (5.420) (5.975)
Observations 17199 17199 17199 17199 17199
R2 0.198 0.209 0.270 0.259 0.295
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 10: Different Measures of Home Hours of Married Agents
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Figure 18: Home Hours for Households With and Without Children
2003. The results are shown in table 10. The coefficients of the year dummies indicate
the time-trend for female home hours. The trend in male hours is given by the sum
of coefficients of the year dummies and their corresponding interaction with the male
dummy. Across the five measures, the only coefficients differing in signs are on the year
1985 and the year 2003 dummy for child care. For all other measures of home hours they
are significantly negative, indicating a downward trend in female hours. The coefficient
on the dummy for male respondents is significantly negative and substantially big (in
absolute values). Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction of year dummies and the
dummy for males is significantly positive and exceed the overall year effect. This indicates
that in 1965 married men worked fewer hours at home than married women, and that
over time male hours have been rising and female hours falling.
My preferred measure is ‘Non-Market Work including Basic Child Care’. Although
most parents might enjoy child care more than other domestic chores, I do include basic
care, as it is a necessary task to be done. The change in home hours over time is similar
across households with and without children (living at home), as shown in figure 18.
While these two household types have different levels of home hours, both display the
decline in women’s and the rise in men’s hours.
One final comment is in order. Since marital status in the Aguiar and Hurst (2007)
data is defined in a legal sense, it is not possible to disentangle cohabiting from other
singles. But since it is more likely that men and women who are not married, but have
children together, are cohabiting, the current number of children can be employed as a
proxy. Since changes in cohabitation affect mainly younger people, I plot in figure 19
non-market hours worked for men and women aged 20-40. Over time, as relative female
wages rise, women spend less time working at home, whereas men devote more time to
non-market work. These effects are strongest for married men and women, followed by
singles with children. This evidence supports that single men with no children, who are
more likely to be without a female partner, are not affected by female relative wages. For
single women, however, the trends in home hours of those with and without children are
very similar, and virtually flat.
Notice that in the dataset time spent on activities is measured in hours per week. In
the model, agents have each period a time endowment of 1 that they can split between
market work, home work, and leisure time. Assuming that people need 8 hours of rest
every day, the principal total of 168 hours a week leaves 112 discretionary hours over
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which people can decide. Hence to map data from Aguiar and Hurst (2007) into my
model, I divide all hours by 112.
A.3 Market Work in the Time Use Data
I conduct the same analysis for market hours as I did for home hours. For nm and nf , I
scale Aguiar and Hurst (2007)’s measure ‘Work’ down by factor 112, the endowment of
discretionary hours per week. The measure ‘Work’ includes besides actual work, necessary
travel and other work-related time spent, as well as time spent looking for work. I regress
nm and nf separately for married males and married females on a polynomial in age,
number of children, and year dummies26. The results are shown in table 11. Whereas for
females the number of children at home does have a significantly and substantial negative
effect on the hours they work in the market, there is no significant effect of children in
the household on male hours worked.
The sum of weekly hours spent on market and home work is shown in figure 20. As a
consistency check of my assumption that 2/3 of the weekly time is discretionary time, I
26Restricting the sample to married males and females below the age of 65 does not change the results
substantially.
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Regressions of Market Hours of Married Males and Females
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Married Males Married Females
Dummy Year 1975 0.0394*** -0.0396***
(0.0144) (0.0109)
Dummy Year 1985 -0.00268 -0.0287***
(0.0109) (0.00866)
Number of Kids in Hh -0.000359 -0.0344***
(0.0128) (0.00871)
(Number of Kids in Hh)2 -0.000469 0.00286
(0.00306) (0.00188)
Age -0.0101 0.00316
(0.0236) (0.0129)
Age2 0.000580 0.000153
(0.000559) (0.000318)
Age3 -7.31e-06* -3.11e-06
(4.25e-06) (2.49e-06)
Constant 0.363 0.0951
(0.314) (0.163)
Observations 6211 7136
R2 0.036 0.027
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Omitted is the 2003 year dummy
Table 11: Regressions of Market Hours of Married Males and Females
compute in the data how many respondents’ answers are consistent with n+ h ≤ 1. The
assumption holds for 99.09% of the respondents.
A.4 PSID versus CPS Data
The sample size of the PSID is small compared to the Current Population Survey (CPS),
which I retrieve from IPUMS, provided by King et al.. However, there are advantages
of using the PSID data. Prior to 1975, the CPS did not ask respondents for the exact
number of weeks worked last year (but only for a bracketing), and did not ask at all for
the usual hours worked per week. Therefore one cannot construct a reliable measure of
yearly hours worked before 1975. In all years since its launch in 1962, however, the CPS
asked for hours worked in the previous week. I can map this too into my model. In
particular, under my assumption that 2/3 of time is disposable, I divide ‘hours worked
last week’ by (2/3× 24× 7) to obtain a yearly analogue of male and female labor supply
out of a time endowment of 1. Then I take averages over non-overlapping windows of 10
years, which is the length of one period in my calibrated model. In figure 21 I compare
male and female market labor as indicated by the CPS and the PSID data. The data
is very similar. Albeit the CPS suggests a slightly higher level for married men’s labor
supply, the two surveys show the same trends over time. Also hourly wages, calculated
as last year’s wage and salary income divided by last year’s hours worked, in the CPS
are not available before 1975. Therefore I can only obtain the gender wage gap from the
regression specified in 27 from 1975 onward. In figure 22 I show the estimated gender
wage gap based on PSID and on CPS data. For the available years, they are very similar.
Calibrating the model against the smaller PSID sample, seems therefore unproblematic
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for this paper.
B Derivations
B.1 Couple’s Optimization Problem
To derive the intratemporal optimality conditions for the couple’s optimization program,
substitute out cm and e in 8 from the constraints as
cm =
{
(1 + r)a+ w˜mnm + w˜fnf − cf − e− a′ for j < Tr
(1 + r)a+ Tss − cf − e− a′ for j ≥ Tr
e =
(
x¯(bh)
(zmhm + zfhf )1−γ
) 1
γ
Let the multiplier on the male and female time constraints (12) be λm and λf . To ease
notation, let Ib = b for j = 1 and Ib = 0 otherwise. Then, conditional on fertility choices
and aggregate variables, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are:
∂V (a; b, j)
∂a′
= θ
∂um
∂cm
∂cm
∂a′
+ β
∂V (a′, b′, j + 1)
∂a′
= 0⇒ θ∂um
∂cm
= β
∂V (a′; b, j + 1)
∂a′
(34)
∂V (a; b, j)
∂cf
= θ
∂um
∂cm
∂cm
∂cf
+ (1− θ)∂uf
∂cf
= 0⇒ ∂um
∂cm
=
1− θ
θ
∂uf
∂cf
∂V (a; b, j)
∂nm
= θ
∂um
∂cm
∂cm
∂nm
+ θ
∂um
∂nm
− λm = 0⇒ −∂um
∂nm
=
∂um
∂cm
w˜m − λm
θ
∂V (a; b, j)
∂nf
= θ
∂um
∂cm
∂cm
∂nf
+ (1− θ)∂uf
∂nf
− λf = 0⇒ −∂uf
∂nf
=
θ
1− θ
∂um
∂cm
w˜f − λf
1− θ
∂V (a; b, j)
∂hm
= θ
∂um
∂cm
∂cm
∂e
∂e
∂hm
+ θ
∂um
∂hm
− λm = 0⇒ −∂um
∂hm
= −∂um
∂cm
∂e
∂hm
− λm
θ
⇒ −∂um
∂hm
=
∂um
∂cm
1− γ
γ
(
x¯(bh)
zmhm + zfhf
) 1
γ
zm − λm
θ
∂V (a; b, j)
∂hf
= θ
∂um
∂cm
∂cm
∂e
∂e
∂hf
+ (1− θ)∂uf
∂hf
− λf = 0⇒ −∂uf
∂hf
= − θ
1− θ
∂um
∂cm
∂e
∂hf
− λf
1− θ
⇒ −∂uf
∂hf
=
θ
1− θ
∂um
∂cm
1− γ
γ
(
x¯(bh)
zmhm + zfhf
) 1
γ
zf − λf
1− θ
λm(nm + hm − 1) = 0 and λf (nf + hf + τbIb − 1) = 0
The Envelope Condition is ∂V (a;b,j)
∂a
= θ ∂um
∂cm
(1 + r), implying ∂V (a
′;b,j+1)
∂a′ = θ
∂um
∂c′m
(1 + r′),
such that the usual Euler equation ∂um
∂cm
= β(1 + r′)∂um
∂c′m
follows.
With the assumed preferences (6), (34) implies for the allocation of consumption
between the spouses
cf =
(
1− θ
θ
)1/σc
cm (35)
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and the remaining intratemporal first-order conditions become(
φn
(
n1+ηm
1 + η
) s−1
s
+ φh
(
h1+εm
1 + ε
) s−1
s
) 1
s−1
φ˜nn
(s−1)η−1
s
m =
w˜m
cσm
− λm
θ
(36)
φn( n1+ηf
1 + η
) s−1
s
+ φh
(
h1+εf
1 + ε
) s−1
s

1
s−1
φ˜nn
(s−1)η−1
s
f =
θ
1− θ
w˜f
cσm
− λf
1− θ(
φn
(
n1+ηm
1 + η
) s−1
s
+ φh
(
h1+εm
1 + ε
) s−1
s
) 1
s−1
φ˜hh
(s−1)ε−1
s
m =
1
cσm
1− γ
γ
(
x¯(bh)
H
) 1
γ
zm − λm
θφn( n1+ηf
1 + η
) s−1
s
+ φh
(
h1+εf
1 + ε
) s−1
s

1
s−1
φ˜hh
(s−1)ε−1
s
f =
θ
1− θ
1
cσm
1− γ
γ
(
x¯(bh)
H
) 1
γ
zf − λf
1− θ
λm(nm + hm − 1) = 0 and λf (nf + hf + τbIb − 1) = 0
where φ˜n = φn(1 + η)
1/s and φ˜h = φh(1 + ε)
1/s
and H = zmhm + zfhf
Off-Corners: When the time-constraints are not binding, i.e. with λm = λf = 0,
and the elasticity of substitution of disutilities to work goes to infinity, the optimality
conditions for home production imply
hm
hf
=
(
1− θ
θ
zm
zf
)1/ε
as s→∞
which is equation (33) in the main text.
For general s or for corner solutions, either with nm + hm = 1 and λm > 0, or with
nf + hf + τbIb = 1 and λf > 0, or both, there is no closed-form solution for the set of
intratemporal first-order conditions. Hence I solve the set of non-linear KKT equations
(36) numerically, conditional on the individual state variables (assets and number of
children), and the aggregate state variables (interest rate, male and female wages).
For retired households (of age j ≥ Tr) off corners, one can characterize the optimal
choices as a function of consumption further. Since w˜m(j) = w˜f (j) = 0 and thus nm(j) =
nf (j) = 0, the optimality conditions (36) imply
hm(j)
hf (j)
=
(
1− θ
θ
zm
zf
)1/ε
for j ≥ Tr
C More on the Calibration
C.1 Gender Wage Gap as Ratio of Residual Wages
I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1968 to 2007. First I estimate
for men and women between of age 20 to 59 equation (27) by OLS. The obtained estimates
are shown in table 12.
Since E[logwi,t|Dfemalei,t = 1] − E[logwi,t|Dfemalei,t = 0] = β1,t, the gender wage
gap for year t is given by eβ1,t , which I plot in figure 3 of the main text. To feed χt
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Table 12: Regression of Log Wages
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into the model, where a period is 10 years, I take the averages over the appropriate
(non-overlapping) windows.
C.2 Required Amount of Home Production
I aim at finding the parameters of x¯(bh) = κ0 + κ1b
κ2
h by exploiting the observed cross-
sectional variation in a base year of male and female hours against the number of children
in the household. Off-corners the intratemporal first-order conditions (36) for nm and hm
imply
x¯(bh) =
φh
φn
(
1 + ε
1 + η
)1/s
h
(s−1)ε−1
s
m
n
(s−1)η−1
s
m
w˜m
zm
γ
1− γ (zmhm + zfhf )
γ (37)
In the model, hours worked at home and in the market27 depend on the amount of home
goods needed. The dataset provided by Aguiar and Hurst (2007) includes respondents’
wages and number of children in the household for some years. Thus, equation (29) can
be used to back out the parameters of x¯(bh), conditional on all other parameters. I map
Aguiar and Hurst’s data for 1985 into my model, by scaling hours worked such that the
total time endowment is one, as explained above. Then I take averages by the number
of children in the household. Finally I scale male wages from the collapsed data such
that their mean equals the model’s (cohort-size weighted mean) equilibrium wage. Since
x¯(bh) = κ0 + κ1b
κ2
h , it follows
κ0 + κ1b
κ2
h =
(
φh
φn
(
1 + ε
1 + η
)1/s
(hm(bh))
(s−1)ε−1
s
(nm(bh))
(s−1)η−1
s
w˜m
zm
γ
1− γ (zmhm(bh) + zfhf (bh))
)γ
I solve this set of equations for bh = 0, 1, 2 in the three unknowns κ0, κ1, κ2, conditional
on all other parameters.
C.3 Remaining Parameters
Where parameters could not be backed out from model’s equilibrium conditions in combi-
nation with the data and could not be taken from the literature, I choose them to match
features of the 1965 data. I take the demographic structure of 1965 as a given, and com-
pute the cohort densities {µ(j)}Tlj=1 from the United Nations World Population Prospects:
The 2008 Revision.
Conditional on a guess for σb, I choose the remaining parameters to match the mo-
ments shown in table 2, under the fiction that agents assumed prices to remain constant.
{φn, φh, ε, s} are set to match Nm, Hm, Nf , Hf , while φb is set to match the total fertility
rate in 1965. Next, I solve for the final steady state of the model under these parame-
ters. If the final TFR is close to 2, I keep the values as calibrated parameters. If not I
guess a new σb and return to choosing {φn, φh, ε, s}. To note is that changing one of the
parameters in {φn, φh, ε, s} triggers changes in κ0, κ1, κ2 (see the previous section).
27The use of home appliances changes with the required amount, and this has –through the budget
constraint– an effect on consumption, which affects labor supply, by (36).
51
D More Results
Figure 8 of the main text shows the model-implied behavior of aggregate variables, aver-
aging over all households alive. Figure 23 also shows the disaggregated transition paths
for the different age groups in the benchmark model (θ = 0.5; γ = 0.2).
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Figure 23: Transition of the Benchmark Model – Disaggregation by Age
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E Alternative Model: Time and Age-Specific Gender
Wage Gap
In an alternative model specification, I allow the gender wage gap to depend on time and
age. For this model variant, I impose for female labor productivities
pf,t(j) = χt(j)pm(j)
The transition of the unitary model, feeding in time- and age specific relative wages,
under calibrated parameters, with γ = 0.08, is shown in figure 24. The results are similar
to the benchmark calibration.
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Figure 24: Transition Path of the Alternative Model
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